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Family Firm and Analyst Forecasts in an Emerging Economy   
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine how family firms affect analyst forecast 
dispersion, accuracy and optimism and how earnings smoothness as the moderating factor, 
affects these relationships in an emerging market context.  
 
Design/methodology/approach - This paper uses the population sample of firms listed on 
the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2010 as the research sample, which includes 963 
firm-year observations.   
 
Findings – The findings show that analysts following family firms are more likely to have 
more dispersed, less accurate and more optimism biased forecasts than those following 
nonfamily firms. Earning smoothness is mainly used by nonfamily firms as a signalling 
strategy to improve analyst forecast quality. In contrast, earnings smoothness is mainly used 
by families as a garbling strategy, stimulating forecast optimism. Only earnings smoothness 
in family firms with a high level of family ownership concentration is likely to be 
signalling-oriented to improve analyst forecast accuracy and mitigate analyst optimism 
biases.  
 
Originality/value – Emerging markets are not only featured by prevailing principal-principal 
conflicts but also have multiple levels of agency conflicts among large shareholders, minority 
shareholders and professionally hired managers. This research reveals the multiple 
governance roles of family owners in affecting analyst forecast quality, including their 
entrenchment role in extracting private benefits of control through opaque environments and 
market discipline distortion role in aligning interests between managers and families without 
prioritising meeting or beating analyst forecasts, both at the cost of minority shareholders. 
This research further disentangles the intertwined signaling oriented and garbiling oriented 
incentives associated with earnings smoothness under family governance.  
 
Keywords Family firms, analyst forecasts, emerging economies 
Paper type Research paper 
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1. Introduction  
Analyst forecasts, as an essential input to an investor’s assessment of a firm’s fundamental 
investment value (Sambharya, 2011), are important to market efficiency and investor 
protection (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Yu, 2008; Huang et al., 2017). Efficient markets can 
impose market discipline on both family owners and professionally hired managers in 
advanced economies with strong institutional environments. Thus analyst forecasts by setting 
the performance benchmark for both professionally hired managers and family owners to 
meet or beat, are able to exert pressure on both professionally hired managers and family 
owners to communicate information with analysts for professional managers’ career security 
concerns as well as family owners’ wealth concerns (Graham et al., 2005; Yu, 2008; He and 
Tian, 2013; Huang et al., 2017).  
However, both professionally hired managers and family owners have incentives to 
suppress information from analysts when they entrench themselves to extract private benefits 
through organizational opacity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which ultimately damages 
analyst forecast quality (Hope, 2003; Duru and Reeb, 2002; Hutton, 2005; Hassell and 
Jennings, 1986). Facing the similiar trade-off associated with benefits of enhanced 
transparency to guide analysts for meeting or beating their forecasts and costs of releasing 
private information to analysts in terms of losing some private benefits of control, family 
firms and nonfamily firms in advanced economies associated with strong institutional 
environments should have similar mixed incentives to communicate information to analysts, 
and thus should have similar analyst forecast outcomes. From a theoretical point of view, it is 
difficult to differ between family and nonfamily firms and it should not be surprising to find 
mixed and unclear empirical evidence on the family impacts on analyst forecasts documented 
in literature focusing on advanced economies. 
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But many emerging markets are featured with concentrated ownership, poor disclosure 
quality, and overall weak institutional environments (Claessens et al., 2000). While market 
discipline may be still effective over professional managers, its discipline impacts on large 
shareholders can be significantly weakened by large shareholders’ pyramid and cross-holding 
ownership structures (Claessens et al., 2000; Zhang et al., 2013). Within this distorted market 
discipline environment, professionally hired managers and large shareholders may have 
different benefit and cost trade-offs associated with meeting or beating analyst forecasts, and 
thus have large shareholder-professionally hired managers conflicts in terms of 
communicating information to analysts. But little is known yet how family firms and 
nonfamily firms may be different in terms of the analyst forecast quality within this distorted 
market discipline environment. This paper fills the conceptual and empirical gaps by 
investigating how family control affects analyst forecast dispersion, accuracy and optimism 
in general, and in particular how earnings smoothness as the moderating factor, affects these 
relationships in an emerging market context.  
Our research contributes to corporate governance and family business literature in a few 
important ways. First, this research allows us to expand and contextualize nascent 
understanding of the multiple agency perspective (e.g., Bruton et al., 2010; Filatctchev et al.,  
2011; Zhang et al., 2013) which considers the multiple governance roles of the same 
participants in affecting analyst forecast quality. We build on previous literature which 
suggests largest shareholders can abuse their pyramid and cross-holding ownership structures 
to entrench themselves and extract private benefits via related-party transactions or tunneling 
at the cost of minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000).  Large shareholders by 
entrenching themselves mitigate market discipline imposed on them, but increase 
career-related risk for professionally hired managers whose entrenchment is constrained and 
whose careers are still subject to market discipline (Zhang et al., 2013; 2017). Subject to a 
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higher level of market discipline than large shareholders but constrained by more limited 
channels to extract private benefits, professionally hired managers, with their private 
information, have a higher priority to meet or beat analyst forecasts. Eventually, this may lead 
to some loss of large shareholders’ private beneifts of controls. This clearly highlights a 
setting associated with multiple levels of agency conflicts including large 
shareholder-minority shareholder conflicts, large shareholder-manager agent conflicts as well 
as minority shareholders-manager agent conflicts. As a unique type of large shareholders, 
family shareholders are more likely than nonfamily large shareholders (such as corporate 
institutions, financial institutions, or states ect) to replace market discipline with family 
discipline over professionally hired managers to protect family private benefits of control 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Zhang et al., 2013). We investigate how such distorted market 
discipline by family control mitigates large family-manager agent conflicts but augments 
both large family shareholder-minority shareholders and minority shareholders-manager 
agent conflicts. This research extends previous research on the multiple governance roles 
played by family owners in affecting management turnover (Zhang et al., 2013) and private 
information abuse (Filatotchev et al., 2011) by revealing those played by family owners in 
affecting analyst forecasts.  
Second, we investigate the different moderation impacts on family control-analyst 
forecast quality relationships associated with earnings smoothness under different levels of 
family ownership concentration. We focus on earnings smoothness as the moderating factor 
in affecting family control and analyst forecasts for two reasons. First, earnings smoothing is 
the common practice adopted by management which allows managers to manipulate 
accounting accruals in order to reduce fluctuations in a time series of reported earnings 
(Graham et al.,2005). Second, it is not clear yet whether earnings smoothness is signalling 
oriented or garbling oriented, especially within a setting featured by multiple levels of agency 
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conflicts. This paper explores how the multiple levels of agency conflicts in family firms can 
be different from those in nonfamily firms, which leads to earnings smoothness in nonfamily 
firms being used as a signalling strategy, whilst as a garbling strategy in family firms. We 
further focus on the changing moderation impacts on family control-analyst forecast quality 
relationships of earnings smoothness under different levels of family ownership concentration. 
The changing family ownership concentration reveals the relative weight change of the 
underlying alignment incentives over the dominating entrenchment incentives of family 
owners in a weak institutional environment and ultimately the changing impacts of earning 
smoothness on analyst forecast quality. We therefore enhance our understanding of how 
family firms differ from nonfamily firms in terms of using earnings smoothness as a 
transmissional mechanism to affect analyst forecasts within a multiple agency conflict 
framework. 
Finally, we test our theoretical assumptions using the population sample of firms listed 
in Taiwan. Although this paper focuses on a single market, Taiwan is a model for emerging 
economies. At the same time Taiwan provides a good balanced sample of family firms and 
nonfamily firms in a much weaker institutional environment, compared with those advanced 
economies such as the U.S. /U.K. Such a weak institutional environment fertilises multiple 
levels of agency conflicts (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Zhang et al., 2013), which provides us 
an experimental opportunity to extend previous research into an emerging market context in 
order to better understand family multiple governance roles in affecting analyst forecasts.  
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents theory and hypothesis 
development.  Second 3 provides sample and data.  Section 4 provides empirical findings. 
Discussions and conclusions are in Section 5.  
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses Development 
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2.1 Analyst forecast quality in family firms versus nonfamily firms  
Agency theory suggests that the separation between ownership and control in many advanced 
economies with dispersed ownership structures stimulates principal-agency conflicts and rent 
extraction behaviors by opportunsic managers at the costs of dispersed shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Analysts, as the sophisticated information intermediators linking 
management to investors, play an important role to promote both market efficiency and 
effective market discipline over management (Sambharya, 2011; Yu, 2008; Huang et al., 
2017). It is not surprising that professionally hired managers, concerned with their salaries 
and career-related issues in the manager labor market, view analyst earnings forecasts as an 
important earnings benchmark to meet or beat (Graham et al., 2005; Yu, 2008). In order to 
meet or beat analyst forecasts, managers have incentives to guide analysts (Cheong and 
Thomas, 2011) by helping them incorporate more information into their forecasts. These then 
ultimately become less optimistically biased, more accurate, and less dispersed than unguided 
ones (Hassell and Jennings, 1986; Duru and Reeb, 2002; Hope, 2003; Hutton, 2005).  
 However, managers can entrench themselves (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens and 
Fan, 2002). Despite that in many advanced economies, where it is not common for managers 
to build complicated pyramid or cross-holding ownership structures to entrench themselves, 
opportunistic managers can augment their control using dual-class shares and compromise 
market discipline (Huang et al., 2017). Thus entrenched managers, by compromising market 
discipline, enhance opportunities to extract private benefits of control, which can outweigh 
the benefits of meeting or beating analyst forecasts. To extract their private benefits of control, 
managers can increase earnings opacity (Haw et al., 2004; Gopalan and Jayaraman, 2012), 
reduce earnings informativeness (Francis et al., 2005), restrict the levels of compensation 
disclosure (Tinaikar, 2014), and delay loss reporting (Khurana et al., 2013). Opportunistic 
managers, by damaging the quality of both public and private information received by 
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analysts, can reduce analyst forecast quality, leading to increased forecast dispersion and 
reduced accuracy (Hope, 2003) as well as more optimistically biased earnings forecasts 
(Duru and Reeb, 2002).  
Similar to many professionally hired managers, family shareholders in firms from 
advanced economies with strong institutional environments are also subject to strong market 
discipline to meet or beat analyst forecasts in order to prevent falls in share price and 
maintain family wealth. They also have incentives to extract rents within an opaque 
environment when they are entrenched (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Therefore, in advanced economies, the trade-off associated with benefits of enhanced 
transparency to guide analysts for meeting or beating their forecasts for family owners and 
costs of releasing private information to analysts in terms of losing some family private 
benefits of control may be similar as the trade-off faced by professionally hired managers in 
many nonfamily firms. From a theoretical point of view, family firms and nonfamily firms, 
by having similar mixed incentives to communicate information to analysts, should not have 
different analyst forecast outcomes.  
 Different from advanced economies with strong institutional environments, emerging 
markets are featured with concentrated ownership, poor disclosure quality, and overall weak 
institutional environments (Claessens and Fan, 2002). Powerful large shareholders, by using 
their ownership pyramids and cross-holdings, effectively entrench themselves and weaken 
market discipline (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Zhang et al., 2013; 2017). A weakened market 
discipline over large family shareholders makes meeting or beating analyst forecasts less 
beneficial, bearing in mind the complex pyramid and cross-holding ownership strutures in 
place which facilitate their extraction of private benefits through opaque environments 
(Johnson et al., 2000; Baek et al., 2006). Facing this changed benefit and costs trade-off 
associated with meeting or beating analyst forecasts, large shareholders clearly put a low 
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priority on communicating information to analysts in order to protect their private benefits of 
control, thus stimulating large shareholder-minority shareholder conflicts.  
 In contrast, professionally hired managers, without available entrenchment mechanisms 
in many emerging markets, are subject to a higher level of market discipline than large 
shareholders but constrained by more limited channels to extract private benefits (Zhang et 
al., 2013; Huang et al., 2017). Facing large shareholder’s rent extractions, professionally 
hired managers can suffer an increased career-related risk (Zhang et al., 2013). This is 
because the rent extractions by large shareholders in an opaque environment can lead to 
analysts overestimating the firm’s future earnings and ultimately result in managers being 
tagged as incompetent by both large shareholders and minority shareholders if they do not 
guide analyst forecasts and eventually miss analyst forecasts (Leuz et al., 2003; Graham et al., 
2005). Thus professionally hired managers, facing the benefits of guiding analyst forecasts to 
mitigate career risk at a reduced cost of losing their limited private benefits of control when 
they communicate their private information to analysts (i.e. benefit and cost tradeoffs 
different to those faced by large shareholders), clearly put a high priority on communicating 
information to analysts. Thus facing the well-recognised principal-principal or large 
shareholder-minority sharheolders conflicts in many emerging markets, large shareholders 
also stimulate additional conflicts with professionally hired managers regarding their priority 
in communicating information to analysts. This creates multiple levels of agency conflicts 
among large shareholders, minority shareholders and professionally hired manager agents 
(Filatotchev et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2013).  
 Within the multiple levels of agency conflicts regarding the priority of communicating 
information to analysts in emerging markets, we argue that a large family shareholder is more 
likely to distort market discipline over professionally hired managers than other nonfamily 
large shareholders in order to mitigate large shareholder-manager agent conflicts in terms of 
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not pioritising the meeting or beating of analyst forecasts. First of all, the concentration of 
personal and family wealth in family-controlled firms normally creates a preference for 
wealth distribution (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Miller et al., 2007) and risk taking (John et 
al., 2008; Faccio et al., 2011) which maximizes the benefits of dominant family owners. 
Emerging economies generally have low levels of shareholder protection in the legal and 
regulatory institutions, which provides family owners’ strong incentives to extract private 
benefits of control at the costs of minority shareholders (Peng and Jiang, 2010; Filatotchev et 
al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2013). Second, family concentrated ownership is more likely to be the 
result of stock pyramids and cross-ownership (Claessens and Fan, 2002), which creates an 
opaque and complex information environment to facilitate private rent extraction, mainly via 
related party transactions or tunneling (Zhang et al., 2015; 2017). Thus family shareholders in 
emerging markets are more likely to be motivated to distort public and private information 
disclosure to mislead minority shareholders in order to gain private benefits of control (Zhang 
et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2008). Third, in order to prevent managers communicating 
information to analysts, large family shareholders are more likely than other types of large 
shareholders to reduce managers’ job security concerns by replacing market discipline over 
them with family discipline (Zhang et al., 2013). Quite often, family shareholders occupy key 
managerial positions (Morck and Yeung, 2003; Fltotatchev et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2013) in 
order to closely monitor professionally hired managers, which further strengthens family 
discipline and mitigates market discipline over professionally hired managers. Family owners 
are found to maintain job security for managers who distort public disclosure in order to 
facilitate family tunneling activities (Zhang et al., 2013). However, the aligned interests 
between large family owners and manager agents in not prioritising meeting or beating 
analyst forecasts augments both large family shareholder-minority shareholders conflicts and 
minority shareholders-manager agent conflicts, leading to unguided analyst forecasts. In 
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contrast, within many nonfamily firms, facing exploitation by large shareholders at the costs 
of minority shareholders, professionally hired managers and minority shareholders may have 
better aligned interests in terms of their priority to communicate information to analysts. The 
less effective distortions over market discipline over professionally hired managers by large 
nonfamily shareholders than by large family shareholders reduce information asymmetryes 
between management and analysts, augmenting large nonfamily shareholder-manager agent 
conflicts but mitigating minority shareholders-manager agent conflicts. Thus, compared with 
nonfamily firms, family firms should augment information asymmetries and damage analyst 
forecast quality, leading to wide forecast dispersions, low forecast accuracy and more forecast 
optimism bias. Therefore, this paper proposes the following hypotheses:  
H1. Analysts following family firms generate forecasts with wider analyst forecast 
dispersion than those following nonfamily firms in an emerging economy.  
H2. Analysts following family firms generate forecasts with lower accuracy than  
those following nonfamily firms in an emerging economy.  
H3. Analysts following family firms have more forecast optimism bias than those 
following nonfamily firms in an emerging economy. 
 
2.2 Earnings smoothness used as signaling or garbling strategies by families 
Earnings smoothing is a common practice adopted by management, which allows managers 
to manipulate accounting accruals in order to reduce fluctuations in a time series of reported 
earnings (Graham et al., 2005). Previous research has documented that managers have their 
intertwined incentives to smooth earnings, leading to either signaling-oriented earnings 
smoothing (Demski, 1998; Subramanyam, 1996) or garbling-oriented earnings smoothing 
(Lambert, 1984; Lang and Maffett, 2011). Signaling-oriented earnings smoothness, by 
signaling managerial private information to market participants about future earnings, can 
reflect the true performance of a firm (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006) and improve the 
informativeness of earnings (Francis et al., 2004; Cascino et al., 2010). Previous research 
finds that signaling oriented earnings smoothness makes it easier for financial information 
users, especially analysts, to infer the fundamental investment value of a firm (Kirschenheiter 
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and Melumad, 2002) and recognise the quality of the manager (Chaney and Lewis, 1995). 
Analysts prefer to follow firms with signaling-oriented earnings smoothness (Graham et al., 
2005) as this enhances the quality of analysts’ common public information, as well as 
improves the quality of analysts’ private information (He et al., 2010).  Hence, signaling 
oriented earning smoothness can relieve adverse selection problems and help analysts better 
incorporate firm information into their forecasts, leading to reduced information asymmetries 
between firms and analysts (Verrecchia, 2001; Yang, 2010) and ultimately less dispersed 
analyst forecasts, more accurate forecasts and fewer optimism biased forecasts.  
 However, opportunistic managers can also use earnings smoothing strategies to 
misrepresent the firm’s actual earnings performance and extract their private benefits, which 
is referred to as a garbling-oriented earnings smoothing strategy (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; 
Zhang et al., 2013). Thus garbling-oriented earnings smoothness may be used to suppress 
information, especially negative information related to private rent extraction by managers, to 
market participants, augmenting information asymmetries, enlarging the bid-ask spreads 
(Habib and Jiang, 2012) and ultimately reducing analysts’ overall forecast quality. 
 Based on our previous analysis, in many advanced economies, both managers and family 
owners are subject to effective market discipline and have similar signaling incentives to use 
smoothed earnings to guide analyst forecasts (Francis et al., 2004; Cascino et al., 2010), but 
also have similar garbling incentives to use smoothed earnings to mislead analyst forecasts 
when they can entrench themselves. This leads to difficulties in differentiating between 
family firms and nonfamily firms in terms of the incentives behind their smoothed earnings. 
However, in emerging economies, managers and family owners are under different market 
discipline and thus have different incentives to smooth earnings, which in theory, makes it 
possible to differentiate family firms from nonfamily firms in terms of the incentives behind 
their smoothed earnings.  
  
 12 
 We argue that, given the large shareholder-manager agent conflicts within the multiple 
level of agency conflicts, professionally hired managers in many nonfamily firms are subject 
to market discipline and thus are more likely to use smoothed earnings to signal their private 
information about large shareholder’s tunneling activities to analysts in order to beat or meet 
analyst forecast benchmarks for their own career concerns. This can lead to some loss of 
large shareholders’ private benefits of control but better aligns the interests between minority 
sharheolders and professionally hired managers. In contrast, family owners, by replacing 
market discipline with family discipline over managers and mitigating their job security 
concerns for serving family interests, better align managers’ interests with family owners’ 
interests in terms of their garbling oriented earnings smoothness, which facilitates family 
owners rent extraction but at the costs of minority shareholders. Hence, this paper suggests 
that analysts following family firms have better forecast quality and develop the following 
hypotheses:  
 
H4. Analysts following family firms have more dispersed forecasts than those following 
nonfamily firms when earnings become increasingly smoothed in an emerging 
economy. 
H5. Analysts following family firms have less accurate forecasts than those following 
nonfamily firms when earnings become increasingly smoothed in an emerging 
economy. 
H6. Analysts following family firms have more optimism bias than those following 
nonfamily firms when earnings become increasingly smoothed in an emerging 
economy.  
 
2.3 Changing incentives behind earnings smoothness under different types of family firm with 
different levels of family ownership concentration 
Agency research suggests that family interests can be better aligned with minority 
shareholders by higher levels of ownership concentration (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Chen et 
al., 2005; Ali et al., 2007; Anderson et al., 2009). This is because a high level of family 
ownership concentration enhances family stewardship and family long-term commitment to 
their firms (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Davis et al., 1997; Schulze et al., 2001; Steier, 2001; 
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Zellweger, 2007) and this constrains their incentives to extract private benefits (Claessens and 
Fan, 2002). A high level of family concentrated wealth is particularly sensitive to any price 
discount due to information asymmetry problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and this 
strengthens market discipline over family owners by enhancing the benefits of meeting or 
beating analyst forecasts. The high level of family ownership concentration, by enhancing 
family alignments with minority shareholders and exposing family owners to the similar 
levels of market discipline imposed on professionally hired managers, makes it more likely 
for family owners to priotise their aims to meet or beat analyst forecasts and therefore avoid 
share price discount and thus family wealth shrinkage. This mitigates multiple agency 
conflicts at all levels, including large family shareholder-minority shareholder conflicts, large 
family shareholders-manager agent conflicts, as well as minority shareholders-manager agent 
conflicts. Therefore we expect to find that the earnings smoothness in this type of family firm 
is more likely to be signalling-oriented to reduce information asymmetries, thus more likely to 
reduce analysts’ overall forecast dispersion, improve analysts’ overall forecast accuracy and 
mitigate analysts’ optimism biases. 
H7. Earning smoothness reduces analyst forecast dispersion in family firms when 
family ownership concentration is high.  
H8. Earning smoothness improves analysts forecast accuracy in family firms when 
family ownership concentration is high. 
H9. Earning smoothness reduces analysts forecast optimism bias in family firms when 
family ownership concentration is high. 
 
 
3. Sample and Data 
This paper uses all firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2010 as the 
research sample, which includes 963 firm-year observations. Following the common practice, 
this paper excludes financial firms because of their different government regulatory 
framework.  After removing the observations with missing values, the final sample has 318 
firm-year observations (involving 141 firm observations in 2009 and 177 firm observations in 
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2010).  In our final sample, companies from the electricity industry are the majority (175 
firm-year observations, 55.03% of the sample), followed by companies from the cement, steel 
and construction industries (38 firm-year observations, 11.95% of the sample) and companies 
from the plastic and rubber industries (23 firm-year observations, 7.23% of the sample).  
The rest of the sample is widely distributed across other industries.  
 
3.1 Family firm  
This paper initially defines family firms as those whose largest shareholder is a family.  This 
paper generates a family dummy variable (Family) equal to 1 if the firm is a family firm, and 
0 otherwise.  Following Filatotchev et al. (2005), membership of the controlling family is 
identified by linking corporate insiders including CEO, board members, board chairman, 
honorary chairman and vice chairman that firstly share a common family name and secondly 
share the same first name of the largest shareholder from the male side of the family name 
with the largest owner.  After identifying family membership, this paper double confirms the 
family ownership data with the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database.  This paper 
achieves consistent family ownership measurement results. TEJ database is a well-established 
database, which has been widely used by prior literature on family businesses focusing on 
Taiwan such as Yang (2010) and Zhang et al., (2013).  
 
3.2 Analyst forecast quality 
Analyst overall forecast quality outcome is captured using three variables including analyst 
forecast dispersion and accuracy, as well as the analyst forecast optimism bias (Duru and 
Reeb, 2002; Hope, 2003; Haw et al., 2010).  Analyst forecast dispersion (Dispersion) is 
measured by the standard deviation of all available forecasts for the corresponding fiscal year 
scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the corresponding fiscal year.  
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Analyst earnings forecast accuracy (Accuracy) is measured by the negative of the 
absolute difference value between the actual earnings per share (EPS) and the average 
forecasts among following analysts for the corresponding fiscal year, deflated by the stock 
price at the beginning of the corresponding fiscal year.  The negative signed value is used to 
facilitate the interpretation that when the measurement value for accuracy increases, the 
overall forecasts become more accurate.  Analyst optimistic forecasts (Optimism) is defined 
as the dummy variable equal to 1 if the signed difference between the consensus forecasts 
among following analysts and the actual EPS for the corresponding fiscal year is positive and 
0 otherwise.  
 
3.3 Earnings smoothness  
Following previous literature (Francis et al., 2004; Cascino et al., 2010), earnings smoothness 
(Smoothness) is measured by the negative signed value of the standard deviation of earnings 
before extraordinary items over the rolling 5-year windows divided by the standard deviation 
of cash flow from operation over the same rolling 5-year windows.  The negative signed 
value is to ensure that the increasing measurement value for Smoothness represents an 
increasingly smoothed earning and thus facilitates our interpretation.  
 
3.4 Control variables 
This paper includes the following control variables which can affect analyst forecast activities.  
To control the monitoring effects associated with block-holders and independent boards in the 
financial reporting process (Yang, 2010; Zhang et al., 2015), this paper uses a variable Block 
equal to 1 if non-controlling block-holders exist in the firm and 0 otherwise; and a variable 
Outdirector measured by the percentage of independent directors within the board. Following 
Lehavy et al. (2011) and Haw et al. (2010), this paper controls forecast complexity and 
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uncertainties using a variable Size calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets, a 
variable Growth calculated as the deviation of the net sales in the current year from the 
previous year scaled by the net sales in the previous year, and a variable Lev calculated as the 
total liabilities divided by total assets. This paper controls a firm’s loss status using a dummy 
variable Loss equal to 1 if the net income in the previous year is negative and 0 otherwise.  
Older firms are more established with more available information for analysts to forecast 
(Easley et al., 1998; Zhang et al., 2015).  This paper controls this using a variable Age 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was incorporated.  
This paper also uses Industry dummy variables to control industry effects following the 
industry classification provided by TEJ and the time effect using a Year dummy variable. The 
variable definitions and measurement are summarized in Table 1. More specifically, our 
regression models to be estimated are:  
mmiesIndustryDusYearDummie
LossGrowthLevSizeAgerOutdirecto
BlockSmoothnessFamilySmoothnessFamilyAnalyst
iiiiii
iiiiiii



987654
3
'
221 *


  
Where Analysti is Analyst forecast dispersion or accuracy or optimism bias as different 
dependent variables used in different regression models.  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
4. Results 
Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics of the variables.  In the sample, family-firms 
account for 182 (57%) observations and nonfamily firms represent the remaining 136 (43%) 
observations, revealing family control as common practice in Taiwan (Claessens and Fan, 
2002).  For the average firm in the sample, the analysts’ overall forecast dispersion is 0.02, 
indicating that the average standard deviation of all available forecasts for a given fiscal year 
accounts for 2% of the corresponding share price.  The analysts’ overall forecast accuracy is 
-0.02, indicating that the average absolute difference between the actual EPS from the 
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consensus forecasts generated by the following analysts for a given fiscal year accounts for 
2% of the corresponding share price.  In the sample, 134 (42%) observations have forecasts 
with optimism bias.  
Smoothness practice varies considerably across the full sample with an average 
smoothness level of -0.85, indicating that on average a firm reduces their earnings volatility 
to 85% of the volatility of their cash flow from operation.  Minimum and maximum values 
are -4.82, and -0.06 respectively, indicating that earnings volatility from the firm with the 
smallest degree of earnings smoothness is 4.82 times of the volatility of cash flow from 
operation while earnings volatility from the firm with the biggest degree of earnings 
smoothness is just 6% of the volatility of cash flow from operation.  The large variance 
across the full sample is also found for firm size and growth rate, with the average firm size 
of 24,642,915 TW$ (17.02 after the natural logarithm transformation), minimum and 
maximum values for firm size being 113,257 TW$ (13.94 after the natural logarithm 
transformation) and 1,386,432,863 TW$ (21.05 after the natural logarithm transformation) 
respectively; and the average growth rate of 0.16, with minimum and maximum values being 
-0.82 and 3.39 respectively. 
Insert Table 2 
 
Table 3 presents Spearman correlations for the variables.  As Table 3 shows, forecast 
dispersion, accuracy and optimism have low correlations, indicating that they capture 
different dimensions of analyst forecast quality.  Table 3 also shows that, compared to 
non-family firms, family firms tend to be older, and have fewer block-holders, fewer outside 
independent directors and higher leverage level.  Analysts following family firms tend to 
generate more dispersed and less accurate forecasts and are more likely to have optimism bias 
than analysts following nonfamily firms; consistent with hypothesis 1, 2 and 3.  The 
Spearman correlation coefficient for any two independent variables is less than 0.60, 
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indicating there are no serious multicollinearity issues in the variables. We also conduct VIF 
analysis, indicating no serious multicollinearity issues.  
Insert Table 3 
 
4.1 Multivariate tests 
We use pooled OLS regressions to estimate family impacts on analyst forecast dispersion and 
accuracy and logit regressions to estimate family impacts on analysts optimism bias. Given 
analyst optimism bias is a dummy variable the logit model, by adopting a logarithmic 
transformation on the dummy outcome variable, allows us to model a nonlinear relationship 
in a linear way. Prior empirical work linking ownership with performance has had to address 
the endogeneity issue of whether ownership change is a cause of, or a response to, 
performance change (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). This is much less problematic for our 
research because our focus is on how the type of a firm, i.e. family firm or nonfamily firm 
affects analyst forecast quality and not on how family ownership change affects firm 
performance. It is less likely that analyst forecast quality change will cause a type change in a 
firm. To alleviate possible endogenous variables in our analysis, we follow prior literature on 
analyst forecasts and family control (Espahbodi et al., 2001; Duru and Reeb, 2002; 
Filatotchev et al., 2011) to carefully select explanatory variables to include them in the logit 
model. Table 4 shows that family dummy is significantly and positively related with analysts’ 
forecast dispersion and negatively related to forecast accuracy, supporting hypothesis 1, and 2. 
These results indicate that family owners in emerging markets are entrenched and family 
firms reduce their following analysts’ forecast quality by enlarging the forecast dispersion 
and reducing the forecast accuracy. Table 4 also shows that family dummy is positively 
related with analysts optimism bias, but insignificant at the conventional level.   
Evaluating the impact of family firms on the analyst forecast dispersion and accuracy 
suggests that family firms increase the analyst forecast dispersion and reduce accuracy degree 
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by 55.56% and 40%, respectively.  This paper calculates dispersion differential as the 
coefficient 
1  multiplied by family firm dummy, divided by the average forecast dispersion 
for the nonfamily sample (0.01*1/0.018); and accuracy differential as the coefficient 
1  
multiplied by family firm dummy, divided by the average forecast accuracy for the nonfamily 
sample (-0.008*1/0.02) respectively.  
Table 4 shows that earnings smoothness reduces analyst forecast dispersion, enhances 
analyst forecast accuracy and mitigates analyst optimism bias. The results suggest that 
enhanced analyst forecast quality is the outcome of signalling oriented earnings smoothness 
used by managers. This confirms that in Taiwan, market discipline is still effective, in line 
with Zhang et al., (2013), such that managers prioritise to meet or beat analysts forecasts 
using signalling oriented earnings smoothness strategies to guide analysts for their own 
career benefits and reduce the chances that private information, especially that which is 
negative in nature and related to tunneling, is suppressed by largest shareholders, in line with 
Zhang et al. (2015).  
In respect of control variables, the findings show that firms with block-holders have less 
forecast optimism bias, indicating noncontrolling block-holders’ monitoring function over 
largest shareholders mitigates large sharheolder-minority shareholders conflicts, in line with 
Zhang et al. (2015). The findings do not show outside directors having significant effect on 
analyst forecasts, indicating such governance mechanism, usually effective in advanced 
economies with strong institutional environments, is not effective in emerging economies. 
This is in line with Claessens and Fan (2002) and further highlights that board governance 
effectiveness is conditional on the institutional environment, especially in emerging 
economies.   
Older firms have less dispersed and more accurate forecasts, indicating that more firm 
historical public information helps analysts improve their overall forecast quality.  Large 
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firms with more growth opportunities and high leverage levels present complex and 
uncertain forecast tasks, leading to more dispersed and inaccurate forecasts and larger 
forecast optimism bias. Firms with loss status have more accurate analyst forecasts, 
indicating that firms with loss status are under strong market discipline and forced to 
disclose more information publically, such as earnings warnings, in line with Chen et al. 
(2008).  
Insert Table 4 
 
Table 5 reports the interaction results between families and earnings smoothness on 
analyst forecast quality outcomes. Table 5 Column 3 shows that family dummy significantly 
and positively interacts with earnings smoothness in affecting analysts’ forecast optimism 
bias, supporting our hypothesis 6. By suppressing more private information, especially 
negative information related to family tunneling activities, received by analysts, earning 
smoothness in family firms augments information asymmetries between family owners and 
analysts and changes the weight of negative private information in the overall amount of 
private information received by analysts (i.e. the structure of private information), leading to 
analyst forecast optimism bias. Families’ effects in changing the structure of private 
information found in this research are in line with Zhang et al. (2015). In addition, after we 
add in the interaction term, the coefficiency of earnings smoothness remains significant and 
negative while the previous insignificant positive coefficiency of family dummy reported in 
Table 4 Column 3 becomes significant. This suggests that earnings smoothness is used by 
professionally hired managers in many nonfamily firms to signal information which 
mitigates analyst forecast optimism bias. In contrast, within a family firm, a family owner 
increases the chances that analysts will generate a forecast optimism bias, supporting our 
hypothesis 3. Taken together, we have some evidence suggesting that strengthening earnings 
smoothness is more likely to be used by families as a garbling strategy which stimulates 
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analyst forecast optimism.  
Insert Table 5 
 
4.2 Different types of family firms with different levels of ownership concentration  
This paper initially defines family firms as those whose largest shareholder is a family and 
our findings from Table 4 and 5 are based on this initial definition. Since, in many emerging 
economies large control stakes are not unusual, minimum thresholds added to define family 
firms (for example, 20%) are common in the literature (Claessens and Fan, 2002). If we use 
the more strict family firm definition (say largest shareholder is a family, plus one which 
controls at least 20% ownership), we may be able to focus on those family firms with 
incentives more aligned with minority shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Results are 
reported in Table 6 Panel A.  
 Table 6 Panel A shows that the previously insignificant interaction relationship, reported 
in Table 5 Column 2, between family firm dummy and earnings smoothness in affecting 
analyst forecast accuracy becomes significantly positive.  This indicates that this type of 
family firm, i.e. family as the largest shareholder with at least 20% ownership, has interests 
better aligned with minority shareholders than family firms with lower ownership 
concentrations. Thus the earnings smoothness in family firms with a high level of family 
ownership concentration is more likely to be used by these types of family owners to signal 
their positive private information in order to address share price discount issues due to the 
adverse selection problems and is less likely to be used by them to suppress negative private 
information related to tunneling for private rent extraction. These two forces come together to 
improve analyst forecast accuracy, supporting our hypothesis 8 and help offset forecast 
optimism bias (i.e. the initial significant interaction relationship, reported in Table 5 Column 
3, between family firm dummy and earnings smoothness in affecting analyst forecast 
optimism becomes insignificant at the conventional level).  
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 To further reveal the strengthening incentives associated with family owners in family 
firms with a high level of family ownership concentration, in Table 6 Panel B, we refocus on 
family firms with those largest family owners having more than median ownership level 
(50% ownership) in the sample. As Table 6 Panel B shows, when family firms with a very 
high level of family ownership concentration (at least 50%), the alignment incentives further 
increase compared with those family firms with at least 20% family ownership concentration 
level. Thus the earnings smoothness in family firms with a very high level of family 
ownership concentration not only improves analyst forecast accuracy, but also reduces 
analyst forecast dispersion, supporting hypothesis 7 and 8, as well as helps to offset forecast 
optimism bias. Taken together, we find evidence suggesting that earning smoothness in a 
family firm with a very high level of family ownership concentration is more likely to be 
used as a signalling strategy rather than a garbling strategy, in line with Cascino et al., 
(2010).  
Insert Table 6 
 
5. Discussions and Conclusions 
Different stakeholders such as large shareholders, minority shareholders and professionally 
hired managers have different trade-offs associated with benefits of enhanced transparency to 
improve analyst forecast quality and costs of releasing private information to analysts in 
terms of some loss of private benefits of control. In many emerging markets, when market 
discipline can be distorted and private rents can be extracted through an opaque information 
environment by large shareholders, analyst forecasts, by setting the performance benchmark 
for professionally hired managers to meet or beat, are able to exert pressure on managers to 
communicate information to analysts for managers’ career security concerns but at the cost of 
large shareholders in terms of some loss of private benefits of control. Under such multiple 
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levels of agency conflicts, it is relatively unexplored how large family shareholders affect the 
trade-offs and this paper attempts to answer this important question.  
Although previous research has documented multiple governance roles of large family 
shareholders in affecting management turnover and private information abuse, our 
understanding of multiple governance roles of family owners in affectimg analyst forecast 
quality is limited. This research investigates how family control affects analyst forecast 
dispersion, accuracy and optimism in general and in particular how earnings smoothness, as 
the moderating factor, affects these relationships within a weak institutional environment. We 
show that large family shareholders lead to more dispersed, less accurate and more optimism 
biased analyst forecasts. Our research contributes to previous research by revealing the 
multiple governance roles of large family shareholders in affecting analyst forecasts, firstly 
their entrenchment role in extracting private benefits of controls through opaque 
environments and secondly their market distortion role in mitigating family-manager agent 
conflicts without improving analyst forecast quality, both at the costs of minority 
shareholders. This analysis, by reavling both family entrenchment and market discipline 
distortion roles over professionally hired managers to protect family private benefits of 
control, supports the theoretical arguments by Coff (1999).   
This study also extends previous research by revealing the different incentives contained 
in smoothing earnings to affect analyst forecasts between family and nonfamily firms. We 
highlight that different multiple levels of agency conflicts between family and nonfamily 
firms are key to differentate the impacts of earnings smoothness on analyst forecast quality. 
The prevailing large shareholder-minority shareholders conflicts and the large 
shareholder-manager agent conflicts in many nonfamily firms from emerging markets better 
align interests between minority shareholders and manager agents, leading to signalling 
oriented earnings smoothness in many nonfamily firms. In contrast, large family 
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shareholder-minority shareholders conflicts, combined with the better aligned interests 
between large family shareholder and manager agents stimulates conflicts between minority 
shareholders and manager agents and leads to garbling oriented earnings smoothness in 
family firms. However, when families have better aligned interests with minority 
shareholders and face more effective market discipline, earnings smoothness is more likely to 
be used as a signalling strategy to improve analyst forecasts. Our analysis helps to 
disentangle conflicting objectives of family shareholders in communicating information to 
analysts and their mixed effects on analyst forecast quality. They may play multiple 
governance roles by enhancing transparency for long-term wealth generation due to their 
aligned interests and stewership on the one hand and engaging in an opportunistic wealth 
distribution in an environment of corporate opacity, due to their entrenchment and market 
discipline distortion role, on the other. Overall, our research helps to better understand how 
and why family firms can be different from nonfamily firms in the agency and strategy 
management literatures. 
 Our research also has important practical implications for regulators. The findings suggest 
large family owners can distort market discipline over professionally hired managers for 
family benefits but at the cost of minority shareholders. Policy makers and regulators should 
consider how to strengthen an independent management team and avoid market discipline 
distortion by large family shareholders. As suggested by Desai et al. (2006), it is important to 
increase the supply of high quality and ethical managers to the labor market on one hand and 
increase the penalty externally imposed on unethical managers on the other, by restricting 
their entry into the labor market for subsequent employment. To achieve a truly independent 
management team, regulators can strengthen analysts’ scrutiny role to put pressure on 
management for reliable information disclosure, especially for those who miss analyst 
forecasts. They can also constrain compensation packages or trigger mandatory management 
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turnover for those managers who consistently miss analyst forecasts or have poor quality 
analyst forecasts. This can strengthen the regulative powers to complement the market 
discipline on professionally hired managers for high quality information disclosure and avoid 
family discipline distortion. Our research shows the board to be ineffective to influence 
analyst forecasts. Regulators should consider how best to improve the effectiveness of the 
board in order to constrain large family shareholders’ power over the board (e.g. by setting a 
mandatory maximum percentage of the board which may be occupied by family members) 
and mitigate their distortion on market discipline for their own benefits. Finally, our research 
shows earnings smoothness can be good or bad depending on the corporate governance 
environment and especially on family owners’ incentives in smoothing earnings. Thus in 
addition to internationally accepted good practice principals and standards of disclosure, 
policy makers and regulators in emerging economies should also consider to improve the 
firm-level governance standards on disclosure incentives. Overall, these are important steps 
in order to strengthen the institutional environment in both regulative and normative aspects 
(Peng and Khoury, 2009) and to support a consistently effective market discipline on both 
managers and controlling families and ultimately, promote market development and wealth 
growth. 
 
6. Further Research  
Our findings indicate a rich set of future research possibilities. For example, our research 
focuses on Taiwan, a model of emerging economies with prevailing large family shareholders. 
Given family governance impacts can vary across different institutional environments (Peng 
and Jiang, 2010), further research can investigate how our results can be applied to other 
emerging economies with a similar institutional environment. These can further enhance our 
understanding of family governance in a more general way. In addition, we assume there are 
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prevailing tunneling activities by large shareholders without considering the various types of 
tunneling activities. Further research can relax such assumptions and investigate how 
different types of tunneling, by different types of large shareholders and their incentives to 
smooth earnings, can affect analyst forecast quality. Finally, we have focused on corporate 
governance factors associated with family control. However, many listed companies in 
emerging economies also have non-family investors, including corporate institutions, 
financial institutions, foreign investors and the state. Therefore, a more refined analysis of 
possible effects of different types of large shareholders would be useful for a better 
understanding of factors affecting the analyst’s information role in emerging economies. For 
example, is state ownership associated with an increased level of analysts forecasts quality 
and more signalling oriented earnings smoothness and why? Do foreign investors “export” 
good corporate governance in terms of better analyst forecast quality and more singalling 
oriented earnings smoothness? Future research should address these important questions. 
 
References 
Ali, A., Chen, T. Y. and Radhakrishnan, S. (2007), “Corporate disclosures by family firms”, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 44 No. 1-2, pp. 238-286. 
Anderson, R., Duru, A. and Reeb, D. (2009), “Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the 
United States”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 92, pp. 205–222. 
Baek, J., Kang, J. and Lee, I. (2006), “Business groups and tunneling: Evidence from private 
securities offerings by Korean Chaebols”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 61, pp. 2415-2449. 
Bruton, G., Filatotchev, I., Chahine, S. and Wright, M. (2010), “Governance, ownership 
structure and performance of IPO firms: The impact of different types of private equity 
investors and institutional environments”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 31 No.5, 
pp. 491–509. 
Carney, M. and Gedajlovic, E. (2002), “The coupling of ownership and control and the 
allocation of financial resources: Evidence from Hong Kong”, Journal of Management 
Studies, Vol. 39 No. 1, pp. 123–146. 
Cascino, S., Pugliese, A., Mussolino, D. and Sansone, C. (2010), “The influence of family 
ownership on the quality of accounting information”, Family Business Review, Vol. 23 
No. 3, pp. 246-265. 
Chaney, P. and Lewis, C. (1995), “Earnings management and firm valuation under 
asymmetric information”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 319-345. 
Chen, S., Chen, X. and Cheng, Q. (2008), “Do family firms provide more or less voluntary 
disclosure?” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 46 No.3, pp. 499–536.  
Chen, Z., Cheung, Y-L., Stouraitis, A., and Wong, A.W.S. (2005), “Ownership concentration, 
firm performance, and dividend policy in Hong Kong”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 
  
 27 
Vol. 12, pp.431-449.  
Cheong, F. and Thomas, J. (2011), “Why do EPS forecast error and dispersion not vary with 
scale? Implications for analyst and managerial behaviour”, Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 49 No. 2, pp. 359-401. 
Claessens, S. and Fan, J. (2002), “Corporate governance in Asia: A survey”, International 
Review of Finance,Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 71–103. 
Coff, R. (1999), “When competitive advantage doesn’t lead to performance: The 
resource-based view and stakeholder bargaining power. Organization Science, Vol. 
10 No.2, pp. 119–133. 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. and Donaldson, L. (1997), “Toward a stewardship theory of 
management”. Academy of Management Review, Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 20-47.  
Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. (1985), “The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and 
consequences”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, pp. 1155–1177.  
Demski, J. (1998), “Performance measure manipulation”, Contemporary Accounting 
Research,Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 261-285.  
Desai, H., Hogan, C. and Wilkins, M. (2006), “The reputational penalty for aggressive 
accounting: Earnings restatements and management turnover”, Accounting Review, Vol. 
81 No.1, pp. 83–112. 
Duru, A. and Reeb, D. (2002), “International diversification and analysts’ forecast accuracy 
and bias”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 77 No. 2, pp. 415-433. 
Easley, D., O'Hara, M. and Paperman, J. (1998), “Financial analysts and information-based 
trade”, Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 1, pp. 175-201. 
Espahbodi, R., Dugar, A. and Tehranian, H. (2001), “Further evidence on optimism and 
underreaction in analysts’ forecasts”, Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 1-21. 
Faccio, M., Marchica, M. T. and Mura, R. (2011), “Large shareholder diversification and 
corporate risktaking”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 2411, pp. 3601–3641. 
Filatotchev, I., Lien, Y. and Piesse, J. (2005), “Corporate governance and performance in 
publiclylisted, family-controlled firms: Evidence from Taiwan”, Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, Vol. 22 No.3, pp. 257–283. 
Filatotchev I., Zhang, X. and Piesse, J. (2011), “ Multiple agency perspective, family control 
and private information abuse in an emerging economy”, Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, Vol. 28, pp. 69-93. 
Francis, J., Schipper, K., LaFond, R., Olsson, P. and Schipper, K. (2004), “Cost of equity and 
earnings attributes”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 79 No. 4, pp. 967-1010. 
Francis, J., Schipper, K. and Vincent, L. (2005), “Earnings and dividend informativeness 
when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights”, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 39, pp. 329-360. 
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole. (1995), “A theory of income and dividend smoothing based on 
incumbency rents”, Journal of Political Economy, No. 103, pp. 75-93. 
Graham, J., Harvey, C. and Rajgopal, S. (2005), “The economic implications of corporate 
financial reporting”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 40 No. 1-3, pp. 3-73.  
Gopalan, R. and Jayaraman, S. (2012), “Private control benefits and earnings management: 
evidence from insider controlled firms”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 50 No.1, 
pp. 117-157. 
Habib, A. and Jiang, H. (2012), “Managerial ownership-induced income smoothing and 
information asymmetry”, Pacific Accounting Review, Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 211–232. 
Hassell, J. M. and Jennings, R. H. (1986), “Relative forecast accuracy and the timing of 
earnings forecast announcements”, Accounting Review, Vol. 61 No.1, pp. 58-75. 
Haw, I. M., Ho, S., Hu, B. and Wu, W. (2010), “Analysts’ forecast properties, concentrated 
ownership and legal institutions”, Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, Vol. 25 
  
 28 
No. 2, pp. 235–260. 
Haw, I., Bingbing, H. and Wu, W. (2004), “Ultimate ownership, income management, and 
legal and extralegal institutions”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 42, pp. 423–463. 
He, J., and X. Tian. (2013), “The dark side of analyst coverage: The case of innovation”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 109 No.3, pp. 856-878.   
He, W, Sidhu, B. and Tan, H. (2010), “Income smoothing and properties of the information 
environment of users of financial statements”, in AAA AAA Annual Meeting and CTLA 
2010, United States of America, San Francisco, 2-4 August. 
Hope, O. (2003), “Accounting policy disclosures and analysts' forecasts”, Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 295-321. 
Huang, S.X., Pereira, R. and Wang C. (2017), “Analysts coverage and the likelihood of 
meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts”, Contemporary Accounting Research. 
Doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12289. 
Hutton, A. (2005), “Determinants of managerial earnings guidance prior to Regulation Fair 
Disclosure and bias in analysts' earnings forecasts”, Contemporary Accounting Research, 
Vol. 22 No.4, pp. 867-914. 
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976), “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, 
and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305–360. 
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2000), “Tunneling”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 90, pp. 22-27. 
Khurana, I. K., Raman, K. K. and Wang, D. (2013), “Weakened outside shareholder rights in 
dual-class firms and timely loss reporting”, Journal of Contemporary Accounting & 
Economics, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 203-220. 
Kirschenheiter, M. and Melumad, N. (2002), ”Can big bath and earnings smoothing co-exist 
ad equilibrium financial reporting stretegies?” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40 
No. 3, pp. 761-796. 
Lambert, R. (1984), “Income smoothing as rational equilibrium behavior”, The Accounting 
Review, Vol. 59 No. 4, pp. 604-618.  
Lehavy, R., Li, F. and Merkley, K. (2011), “The effect of annual report readability on analyst 
following and the properties of their earnings forecasts”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 86 
No. 3, pp. 1087–1115. 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D. and Wysocki, P. D. (2003), “Earnings management and investor 
protection: an international comparison”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 69 No.3, 
pp. 505-527. 
Miller, D., Breton-Miller I., Lester R. and Cannella A. (2007), “Are family firms really 
superior performers?” Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 13, pp. 829-858. 
Morck, R. and Yeung, B. (2003). “Agency problems in large family business groups”, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol.27 pp. 367–382.  
Peng, M. and Jiang, Y. (2010), “Institutions behind family ownership and control in large 
firms”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 47 No. 2, pp. 253–273.  
Peng, M. W. and Khoury, T. A. (2009), “Unbundling the institution–based view of 
international business strategy”, In A. Rugman (Ed.). The Oxford handbook of 
international business, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sambharya, R. B. (2011), "Security analysts' earnings forecasts as a measure of firm 
performance: An empirical exploration of its domain", Management Decision, Vol. 
49 No. 7, pp.1160 – 1181. 
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N. and Buchholtz, A. K. (2001), “Agency 
relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence”, Organizational Science, Vol. 12 No. 
2, pp. 99–116.  
  
 29 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997), “A survey of corporate governance”, Journal of Finance,  
Vol. 52 No. 2, pp. 737–783. 
Steier, L., (2001), “Next-generation entrepreneurs and succession: An exploratory study of 
modes and means of managing social capital”, Family Business Review, Vol.14 No. 3, 
pp. 259-276. 
Subramanyam, K. (1996), “The pricing of discretionary accruals”, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 22, pp. 249-281.  
Tinaikar, S. (2014), “Voluntary disclosure and ownership structure: An analysis of dual class 
firms”, Journal of Management & Governance, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 373-417. 
Tucker, J. and Zarowin, P. (2006), “Does income smoothing improve earnings 
informativeness?” The Accounting Review, Vol. 81 No. 1, pp. 251-270. 
Verrecchia, R. (2001), “Essays on disclosure”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 32, 
pp. 97–180.  
Yang, M. (2010), “The impact of controlling families and family CEOs on earnings 
management”, Family Business Review, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 266-279. 
Yu, F. (2008), “Analysts coverage and earnings management”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 88 No.2, pp. 245-271. 
Zellweger, T. (2007), “Time horizon, costs of equity capital, and generic investment strategies 
of firms”, Family Business Review, Vol. 20 No.1, pp, 1–15.  
Zhang, X., Yang, X., Strange, R. and Zhang, Q. (2017), “Informed trading by foreign 
institutional investors as a constraint on tunneling: Evidence from China”, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review. doi: 10.1111/corg.12206. 
Zhang, X., Piesse, J. and Filatotchev, I. (2015), “Family control, multiple institutional 
block-holders and informed trading”, The European Journal of Finance, Vol. 21 No. 
10-11, pp. 826-847.  
Zhang, X., Wei, J.T. and Wu, H. H. (2013), “Forced financial information restatements and 
management turnover: market discipline and large family shareholders’ intervention in 
an emerging economy”, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol.30 No.4, pp. 
1005-1029.  
 
 
  
 30 
 Variables Definitions Measurement   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I. 
Variable 
definitions and 
measurement 
Family Family firms by linking corporate insiders including CEO, board members, board 
chairman, honorary chairman and vice chairman that firstly share a 
common family name and secondly share the same first name of the 
largest shareholder from the male side of the family name with the largest 
owner 
Dispersion Analyst earnings 
forecast 
dispersion 
the standard deviation of all available forecasts for the corresponding 
fiscal year scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the corresponding 
fiscal year 
Accuracy Analyst earnings 
forecast accuracy 
the negative of the absolute difference value between the actual earnings 
per share (EPS) and the average forecasts among following analysts for 
the corresponding fiscal year, deflated by the stock price at the beginning 
of the corresponding fiscal year 
Optimism Analyst earnings 
forecast 
optimism 
adopting a the dummy variable that equals to 1 if the signed difference 
between the consensus forecasts among following analysts and the actual 
EPS for the corresponding fiscal year is positive and 0 otherwise 
Smoothness Earnings 
smoothness 
the negative signed value of the standard deviation of earnings before 
extraordinary items over the rolling 5-year windows divided by the 
standard deviation of cash flow from operation over the same rolling 
5-year windows.  The negative signed value is to ensure that the 
increasing measurement value for Smoothness represents an increasingly 
smoothed earning and thus facilitates the interpretation. 
Block Blockholders adopting a dummy variable that equal to 1 if non-controlling 
block-holders exist in the firm and 0 otherwise 
Outdirector  Outside directors the percentage of independent directors over the board 
Age Firm age the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was 
incorporated 
Size Firm size the natural logarithm of total assets 
Lev Firm leverage the total liabilities divided by total assets 
Growth Firm growth the deviation of the net sale in the current year from the previous year 
scaled by the net sale in the previous year 
Loss Firm’s loss adopting a dummy variable equals to 1 if the net income in the previous 
year is negative and 0 otherwise 
Year dummy  adopting a dummy variable equals to 1 if the year is 2009 and 0 otherwise 
Industry dummy1  adopting a dummy variable equals to 1 if the industries are cement, steel 
and construction industry and 0 otherwise 
Industry dummy2  adopting a dummy variable equals to 1 if the industries are plastic and 
rubber industry and 0 otherwise 
Industry dummy3  adopting a dummy variable equals to 1 if the industries are electronics 
industry and 0 otherwise 
Notes: All data were collected from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. 
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Variable  Obs. Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
 Family 318 0.57 1.00  0.50 0.00 1.00 
 Dispersion 318 0.02 0.01  0.03 0.00 0.30 
 Accuracy 318 -0.02 -0.01  0.04 -0.34 0.00 
 Optimism 318 0.42 0.00  0.50 0.00 1.00 
 Smoothness 318 -0.85 -0.77  0.62 -4.82 -0.06 
 Block 318 0.80 1.00  0.40 0.00 1.00 
 Outdirector 318 0.12 0.00  0.15 0.00 0.60 
 Age 318 3.25 3.26  0.52 1.64 4.17 
 
 
 
Table II. 
Descriptive statistics  
Size 
Lev 
Growth 
Loss 
318 
318 
318 
318 
17.02 
0.44 
0.16 
0.54 
16.73  
0.45 
0.11 
1.00 
1.43 
0.17 
0.41 
0.50 
13.94 
0.04 
-0.82 
0.00 
21.05 
0.92 
3.39 
1.00 
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  Family Dispersion Accuracy Optimism Smoothness Block Outdirector Age Size Lev Growth Loss 
 Family 1.000            
 Dispersion 0.159*** 1.00           
 Accuracy -0.130** -0.589*** 1.00          
 Optimism 0.099** 0.174*** -0.021 1.00         
 Smoothness 0.006 -0.092* 0.044 -0.086* 1.00        
 Block -0.123** -0.021 0.020 -0.117** -0.090* 1.000       
 Outdirector -0.278*** -0.050 0.050 -0.067 -0.085* 0.095** 1.000      
 
 
 
 
Table III. 
Spearman 
correlation 
matrix   
Age 
Size 
Lev 
Growth 
Loss 
0.285*** 
-0.018 
0.098** 
-0.017 
0.013 
0.084* 
0.108** 
0.172*** 
-0.077* 
-0.292*** 
-0.003 
-0.043 
-0.113** 
0.131*** 
0.179*** 
-0.132*** 
0.168*** 
0.081* 
0.055 
-0.197*** 
-0.030 
-0.003 
0.329*** 
-0.018 
0.008 
-0.107** 
-0.117** 
-0.097** 
-0.018 
-0.026 
-0.462*** 
-0.055 
-0.139*** 
0.057 
0.026 
1.000 
0.200*** 
0.188*** 
-0.045 
0.006 
 
1.000 
0.375*** 
-0.030 
-0.017 
 
 
1.000 
0.103** 
-0.027 
 
 
 
 
0.384*** 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
Notes: *significant at the 10%. **significant at 5%. ***significant at 1%. N=318. 
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  1.Dispersion VIF 2. Accuracy VIF 3. Optimism VIF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table IV. The 
factors affecting 
analysts’ overall 
forecast outcome. 
Constant ( )  -0.031(-0.791)  -0.053(-1.743)*  -6.995(-3.647)***  
Family (
1
 )  0.010(2.125)** 1.22 -0.008(-1.566)* 1.22 0.170(0.599) 1.22 
Smoothness (
2
 )  -0.006(-1.820)** 1.21 0.007(1.927)** 1.21 -0.458(-2.107)** 1.21 
Block (
3
 )  0.002(0.619) 1.06 0.003(0.562) 1.06 -0.566(-1.812)** 1.06 
Outdirector (
4
 )  0.000(-0.003) 1.44 0.016(1.195) 1.44 -0.502(-0.507) 1.44 
Age (
5
 )  -0.009(-1.572)* 1.88 0.016(2.744)*** 1.88 0.385(1.163) 1.88 
Size (
6
 )  0.004(2.108)** 1.27 0.000(-0.380) 1.27 0.258(2.685)*** 1.27 
Lev (
7
 )  0.013(0.956) 1.40 -0.040(-2.434)*** 1.40 -0.182(-0.199) 1.40 
Growth (
8
 )  0.006(0.846) 1.24 0.005(0.830) 1.24 1.435(1.884)** 1.24 
Loss (
9
 )  -0.004(-0.558) 2.73 0.010(1.384)* 2.73 -0.112(-0.270) 2.73 
Year dummy ( )  0.012(1.889) 2.95 0.002(-0.787) 2.95 1.517(2.946)*** 2.95 
Industry dummy1 ( )  0.010(1.494)** 1.50 -0.004(0.307) 1.39 0.880(1.905)** 1.39 
Industry dummy2 ( )  0.002(0.404) 1.29 0.008(-0.577) 1.29 0.891(1.646)* 1.29 
Industry dummy3 ( )  -0.003(-0.592) 2.08 0.002(1.292)* 2.08 0.179(0.461) 2.08 
R2 (%)  11.39 1.63 11.43 1.63 14.17 1.63 
Notes: *significant at the 10%. **significant at 5%. ***significant at 1%. t-Statistics (z-statistics for optimism using logit 
regression) are given within square braces. The heterosedasticity bias is corrected by using the Huber-White process. Industry 
dummy following the industry classification provided by TEJ. N=318. 
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  1. Dispersion VIF 2. Accuracy VIF 3. Optimism VIF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table V. The 
interaction between 
families and 
earnings 
smoothness 
Constant ( ) -0.028 (-0.714)   -0.059 (-1.975)**  -7.841(-3.966)***  
Family (
1
 ) 0.007(0.975)  3.50 -0.002(-0.255)  3.50 0.908(1.917)** 3.50 
Smoothness (
2
 ) -0.004(-1.194)   1.82 0.005(-1.226)  1.82 -0.809(-2.763)*** 1.82 
Family*Smoothness (
'
2
 ) -0.003(-0.524)   3.82 0.007(1.171)  3.82 0.837(1.905)** 3.82 
Block (
3
 ) 0.003(0.641) 1.06 0.003(0.531)  1.06 -0.599(-1.892)** 1.06 
Outdirector (
4
 ) 0.000(0.031)   1.45 0.015(1.134)  1.45 -0.609(-0.616) 1.45 
Age (
5
 ) -0.009(-1.585)*   1.88 0.017(2.798)***  1.88 0.422(1.271) 1.88 
Size (
6
 ) 0.004(2.014)**   1.29 0.000(-0.221)  1.29 0.286(2.911)*** 1.29 
Lev (
7
 ) 0.014(0.976)   1.41 -0.041(-2.496)***  1.41 -0.255(-0.281) 1.41 
Growth (
8
 ) 0.005(0.841)   1.24 0.005(0.889)  1.24 1.406(1.957)** 1.24 
Loss (
9
 ) -0.004(-0.555)   2.73 0.010(1.394)*  2.73 -0.080(-0.201) 2.73 
Year dummy ( ) 0.012(1.916)** 3.00 -0.006(-0.841) 3.00 1.532(3.012)*** 2.96 
Industry dummy1 ( ) 0.011(1.485)* 1.37 0.000(-0.027) 1.37 0.642(1.377)* 1.50 
Industry dummy2 ( ) 0.002(0.422) 1.29 -0.004(-0.614) 1.29 0.833(1.480)* 1.29 
Industry dummy3 ( ) -0.003(-0.580) 2.19 0.008(1.265) 2.19 0.166(0.426) 2.08 
R2 (%) 11.47 2.00 11.72 2.00 14.90 2.00 
Notes: *significant at the 10%. **significant at 5%. ***significant at 1%. t-statistics (z-statistics for optimism using logit 
regression) are given within square braces. The heterosedasticity bias is corrected by using the Huber-White process. Industry 
dummy following the industry classification provided by TEJ. N=318. 
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  Panel A Largest family shareholders have more than 20% ownership 
  1. Dispersion VIF 2. Accuracy VIF 3. Optimsim VIF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VI. Sensitivity tests 
Constant ( ) -0.024(-0.562)  -0.063(-1.850)**  -6.402(-3.321)***  
Family (
1
 ) 0.002(0.282) 3.31 0.007(0.939) 3.31 -0.692(-1.480)* 3.31 
Smoothness (
2
 ) -0.004(-1.089) 1.89 0.001(0.290) 1.89 -0.278(-1.180) 1.89 
Family*Smoothness (
'
2
 ) -0.003(-0.525) 3.78 0.016(2.298)** 3.78 -0.470(-1.100) 3.78 
Block (
3
 ) 0.002(0.560) 1.07 0.003(0.577) 1.07 -0.622(-1.987)** 1.07 
Outdirector (
4
 ) -0.005(-0.428) 1.42 0.018(1.391)* 1.42 -0.462(-0.473) 1.42 
Age (
5
 ) -0.008(-1.420)* 1.86 0.016(2.754)*** 1.86 0.410(1.239) 1.86 
Size (
6
 ) 0.003(1.867)** 1.26 0.000(-0.008) 1.26 0.245(2.502)*** 1.26 
Lev (
7
 ) 0.014(1.007) 1.40 -0.040(-2.543)*** 1.40 -0.130(-0.141) 1.40 
Growth (
8
 ) 0.006(0.821) 1.25 0.006(0.920) 1.25 1.440(1.872)** 1.25 
Loss (
9
 ) -0.003(-0.388) 2.80 0.007(0.986) 2.80 -0.090(-0.220) 2.80 
Year dummy ( ) 0.013(1.933)** 3.00 -0.008(-1.115) 3.00 1.577(3.044)*** 3.00 
Industry dummy1 ( ) 0.013(1.962)** 1.37 -0.002(-0.232) 1.37 0.996(2.100)** 1.37 
Industry dummy2 ( ) 0.003(0.651) 1.29 -0.003 (-0.378) 1.29 0.939(1.750)** 1.29 
Industry dummy3 ( ) -0.002(-0.473) 1.99 1.241(1.241) 2.19 0.046(0.117) 2.19 
R2 10.10  12.65 1.99 14.58 1.99 
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 Panel B Largest family shareholders have more than 50% median level ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VI. Sensitivity 
tests (continued) 
 1. Dispersion VIF 2. Accuracy VIF 3. Optimsim VIF 
Constant ( ) -0.021(-0.529)  -0.063(-1.852)**  -6.868(-3.542)***  
Family (
1
 ) -0.007(-0.826) 3.23 0.021(1.682)** 3.23 0.116(0.151)** 3.23 
Smoothness (
2
 ) -0.005(-1.432)* 1.29 0.005(1.288)* 1.29 -0.468(-2.093)** 1.29 
Family*Smoothness (
'
2
 ) -0.013(-1.348)* 3.25 0.031 (2.419)*** 3.25 0.124(0.152) 3.25 
Block (
3
 ) 0.002(0.537) 1.08 0.003(0.597) 
 
1.08 -0.584(-1.859)**  
 
1.08 
Outdirector (
4
 ) -0.004(-0.324) 1.42 0.017(1.373)* 
 
1.42 -0.600(-0.618)  
 
1.42 
Age (
5
 ) -0.008(-1.357)* 1.92 0.015(2.576)*** 2.96 0.403(1.212)  
 
1.92 
Size (
6
 ) 0.003(1.820)**              1.26 0.000(0.052) 
 
1.26 0.252(2.626)*** 
 
1.26 
Lev (
7
 ) 0.015(1.090) 1.41 -0.042(-2.264)***                         
 
1.41 -0.173(-0.187) 
 
1.41 
Growth (
8
 ) 0.004(0.632) 1.32 0.009(1.469)* 
 
1.32 1.463(1.919)**  
 
1.32 
Loss (
9
 ) -0.003(-0.431) 2.76 0.009(1.177) 
 
2.17 -0.101(-0.246) 
 
2.76 
Year dummy ( ) 0.013(1.959)** 2.96 -0.007(-0.939) 2.96 1.534(2.983)*** 2.96 
Industry dummy1 ( ) 0.014(1.986)** 1.40 -0.002(-0.326) 1.40 0.904(1.914)** 1.40 
Industry dummy2 ( ) 0.005(-1.348)* 1.29 -0.007(-1.010) 1.29 0.926(1.698)** 1.29 
Industry dummy3 ( ) -0.003(-1.348)* 2.17 0.008(1.326)* 2.17 0.161(0.407) 2.17 
R2 (%) 10.02 1.91 12.31 1.91 14.09 1.91 
Notes: * significant at the 10%. **significant at 5%. ***significant at 1%. t-Statistics (z-statistics for optimism using logit  
regression) are given within square braces. The heterosedasticity bias is corrected by using the Huber-White process.  
Industry dummy following the industry classification provided by TEJ. For simplicity, the results for control variables are  
not reported. N=318. 
